In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, many countries in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region crafted democratic constitutions for the new era they were entering. The
model that these countries opted for was Semi-Presidential model. In Palestine, a prime
minister position was added in reaction to the dominant role of former President Yasser
Arafat, with international actors forcing the semi-presidential system onto Palestine’s
parliamentary- based constitution in 2003. These changes were enforced without proper
amendments being made to the temporary constitution, the Basic Law (BL). The imposed
semi-presidential mechanisms generated conflict between the newly-appointed Prime
Minister and the President—neither of whose roles were clearly defined through the adopted
institutional changes. The resulting dysfunction was so extensive that the very legitimacy of
the system of government fell under question. Thus, despite its popularity as a model for
transitioning countries, the semi-presidential system was not an apt choice for Palestine due
to the incompatibility this system has with unstable and immature political environments.
This paper details how, in turbulent political conditions, there is a tendency for semi-
presidential systems to cause political deadlock between its three main players: the President,
the Legislature and the Prime Minster. Indeed, these instabilities created by the semi-
presidential system were critical in leading Palestine towards its own “Arab Spring” moment
in 2007, which split Palestine into two regions: the West Bank, controlled by the Palestinian
Authority (headed by Fatah President Mahmoud Abbas), and the Gaza Strip, controlled by
Hamas. With Hamas members barred from convening in the legislative headquarters in
Ramallah, Palestine entered a period of limbo with no sitting legislative council and a
president, invoking emergency provisions of the BL, ruling by decree.
To unpack the issues of the semi-presidential system in Palestine, this paper uses the
insightful work of Cindy Skach that differentiates the semi-presidential political system into
three distinct subtypes. Skatch’s framework is especially apt as all three forms of the semi-

presidential subtypes, “consolidated majority government,” “divided majority government” /
“cohabitation,” and “divided minority government” were apparent in Palestine between 2003
and 2007. I also explore how, post 2018, Palestine has developed a distinct fourth subtype -
one highlights how the political system in Palestine has completely broken down. Using
Skatch’s framework, I show how the tensions inherent in semi-presidentialism subtypes can
emerge as conflict, and often have negative consequences for democracy. I suggest that the
semi-presidential system in Palestine will always lead to political deadlock and that an entire
new political system needs to be designed from the bottom-up and without explicit
international intervention.
To conclude, I argue that there is an opportunity for this bottom-up process to occur
following the declaration for elections in December 2018. Whilst elections are unlikely to
happen any time soon, the declaration has sparked a grassroot ‘constitutional awareness’
movements in the region that are beginning to influence the constitutional drafting process
occurring within the Palestinian government. Indeed, the recent appointment of diverse
representatives to the drafting council and the emerging mechanisms that allow for direct
engagement with the populace in the drafting process, indicate a potential for meaningful
constitutional reform.

Conference Title

WORLD CONGRESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (WCCL) 2022

Conference Country

Palestine

Conference Date

Dec. 5, 2022 - Dec. 9, 2022

Conference Sponsor

Johannesburg University